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1 Introduction
In January 2018, most of the news media reported that the University of Oxford had decided
to extend the time available to computer science and maths students to complete their exams.
According to The Telegraph (2018), the decision was taken for two reasons: the gender grade gap
between students being awarded first-class degrees in these subjects and evidence suggesting that
females underperform when under time pressure. Accordingly, the board of examiners decided
to lengthen exams from 90 to 105 minutes (Daily Mail, 2018). The social response was divided:
some argued that the move was sexist, while others believed that it would serve to provide
greater gender equality in education.1
Student performance is a strong determinant of individual decisions and future outcomes.
First, university choice depends on the grades obtained throughout high school and on univer-
sity entrance examination results. Second, a university student’s accumulated average grade is
an important criterion when applying for undergraduate grants or scholarships. And, third, an
undergraduate student’s final grade point average (GPA) is crucial when applying for postgrad-
uate degrees or jobs. For example, admission to many master’s programs or applications for
graduate scholarships depend, in part, on a student’s GPA. Likewise, many companies request
a student’s grade transcript and take this into account in their job selection procedures. More-
over, in many countries, many students sit public examinations to become public servants and
in some disciplines there is the need to pass an exam to practice the profession. All this means
that student performance both at university and in these public exams are strong determinants
of future labour outcomes. However, the well-documented gender gap in labour outcomes (see,
for example, Blau and Kahn, 2000; Wolfers, 2006; Goldin et al., 2017; Blau and Kahn, 2017)
highlights the need to understand the potential determinants of gender differences in academic
performance so as to mitigate them and to promote increased gender equality in education and,
hence, in labour opportunities.
In recent years, economic researchers have become increasingly interested in gender differ-
ences in performance when under pressure (see, for example, Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2010; Paserman, 2007; Shurchkov, 2012). However, few studies have analysed the
role of pressure in educational performance across gender using real-world data. While these
papers focus mainly on competitive pressure, their principal data are drawn from schools, na-
tional contests or university entrance exams. Little is known about how test pressure affects
student performance across gender at the university level.2 While in higher education, students
sit a significant number of exams exposing them to different levels of pressure, depending on
the number of credits at stake, the weight of the exam in the final grade, the specific rules of
assessment which might require students to perform better, the difficulty of the exam content,
the type of exam or the simple fact of having to sit an exam. To the best of our knowledge,
only one economic study to date has attempted to analyse pressure as the weight attached to an
1This was not the first occasion that the University of Oxford had modified rules governing its examinations
to reduce the gender grade gap. In 2017, history students were given the opportunity to take exams at home in
an attempt at increasing the number of women obtaining top grades (The Times, 2017).
2Ors et al. (2013) examine student performance on entrance exams to a master’s program (their competitive
setting), but they then compare this gender gap with performance during the master’s (their non-competitive
setting).
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exam, albeit in this instance at high school level (Azmat et al., 2016). Additionally, we are aware
that the multiple choice test is the most frequently adopted format to assess student knowledge
at university, in entrance exams and public examinations. Here, also, published studies have
documented gender differences in the results obtained on multiple choice tests and in the re-
spective answering behaviour by gender. However, little is known about how this gender gap
varies according to the level of pressure faced, highlighting the need for more studies that can
shed light on gender differences attributable to pressure on this test format.
The goal of this paper, therefore, is to study gender differences in academic performance
under different levels of pressure when sitting multiple choice tests. Here, the introduction of
continuous assessment in the evaluation system of a university course allows us to exploit a
unique quasi-experimental setting in which the same students take similar tests but exposed
to different levels of pressure. This setting allows us to structure the dataset in two ways and
to exploit each to the full: independently pooled cross-sections and panel data. Moreover, the
use of unique student administrative data provides us with a rich individual-based dataset to
control for personal and group characteristics that might also determine student performance
and affect gender differences.
We define test pressure as the increased need students feel to perform well on an examination
due to the increasing importance attached to that test. The principal source of test pressure on
students in our main setting is the greater weight attached to a test in the final grade awarded
for the course. Moreover, because in our setting some of the rules of evaluation change over
the years, modifying the pressure students are under when sitting these exams, we perform a
heterogeneity analysis. In this case, the secondary source of test pressure is identified as the rules
of evaluation which require a better performance from the students. The strength of our quasi-
experimental set up is based on five specific characteristics: (i) the tests are machine/computer
corrected so require no subjective bias correction, (ii) the tests present an almost identical
format (multiple choice), employing the same questions, with the same level of difficulty and a
very similar structure, (iii) the same cohort of students sit these tests in scenarios characterised
by different levels of pressure, (iv) the pressure students are under is analysed in a real world
environment i.e. sitting their university exams, and (v) our data and empirical strategy allow
us to explore the possible mechanisms responsible for the results obtained, that is, we are able
to disentangle the main drivers of the gender differences observed.
The empirical results show that, after controlling for individual and group characteristics,
male students perform better than female students when under greater test pressure, but that
this gender gap narrows as test pressure decreases until mitigated and even reversed in favour
of female students. Our pooled cross-sectional estimates allow us to obtain the main results for
each performance separately, to analyse differences along each grade distribution and to assess
self-selection bias related to the decision to take or not take each exam. Our panel data enable us
to reshape the data set and to analyse the setting as a sequential game of two periods, allowing
us to confirm our main results and, moreover, to test for heterogeneity effects in relation to exam
pressure. Finally, we examine the mechanisms underlying the gender gap and study whether
the gap reflects a fall in female performance or a rise in male performance under pressure.
The paper is structured in six sections. Section 2 reviews the most recent and relevant
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literature on the topic. Section 3 describes the institutional setting, explaining the specific
evaluation system used on the course. Section 4 explains the data used and presents the main
descriptive statistics. Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy and Section 6 reports the results
and identifies the possible mechanisms responsible for the results obtained. Finally, the last
section discusses the results and presents the conclusions.
2 Literature Review
Numerous studies have attempted to explain the determinants of gender differences in educa-
tional achievement, especially in relation to mathematics. In the literature, the ”nurture vs
nature” heated debate has been widely explored (González De San Román and De La Rica,
2016; Dee, 2005) with the advocates of biological determinants arguing that innate differences
determine the gender gap in student achievement, while the proponents of environmental deter-
minants claim that the main drivers are social and cultural norms. The economic literature, in
general, has tried to identify these environmental mechanisms, but has not found it easy to dis-
entangle all the possible factors responsible for this gender gap (Bedard and Cho, 2010; Contini
et al., 2017). The most frequently examined causes to date have been family interactions (e.g.
González De San Román and De La Rica, 2016; Farré and Vella, 2013; Rodŕıguez-Planas and
Nollenberger, 2018)), teacher-student interactions (e.g. Hoffmann and Oreopoulos, 2009; Holm-
lund and Sund, 2008; Escard́ıbul and Mora, 2013), competitive pressure (e.g. Ors et al., 2013;
Jurajda and Münich, 2011; Pekkarinen, 2015), and self-beliefs (Contini et al., 2017; Lubienski
et al., 2013), among others. As such, the consensus is that the gender gap is multifactorial and
it is difficult to narrow the determinants down to just a few factors. However, as discussed
in the introduction, test pressure has been the object of few studies in economic research and,
therefore, constitutes the main focus of this paper.
2.1 Psychology literature
In a seminal study, Baumeister (1984) defines the term ”choking under pressure” as a decline in
performance when an individual faces a situation that specifically calls for an improved perfor-
mance, with pressure being considered as ”any factor or combination of factors that increases the
importance of performing well on a particular occasion” (Baumeister, 1984, p.610). He shows,
by way of three experiments, that people’s performance decreases under different pressure sce-
narios: namely, implicit competition, cash incentives and audience-induced pressure. Similarly,
Beilock (2011) suggests that a stressful situation can result in an individual performing below
their true potential. She reports that students might choke when rewards are high and that
high-skilled students are more likely to choke under pressure in important exams. She suggests
that the mechanisms behind the process could be too much concern for the reward itself or
gender stereotypes, among others.
A large body of the psychological literature has focused on the causes of test anxiety, on its
links with academic achievement and on gender differences in relation to this type of anxiety.
Putwain et al. (2010) report a relationship between test anxiety and parental/teacher pressure,
achievement goals and the importance of good performance. Likewise, Chin et al. (2017) find
3
that test anxiety is attributable to worry and the social repercussions of failing. von der Embse
et al. (2018) perform a meta-analysis gathering 30 years of psychological research on test anxiety
and its predictors (from 1988 to present). They review 238 published studies with the goal of
examining the relationship between test anxiety and educational performance and the influence
of individual characteristics on test anxiety. The results show a negative relationship between
test anxiety and educational achievement in terms of students’ average grades, outcomes of uni-
versity entrance examinations and standardized tests. Additionally, self-esteem, test difficulty,
importance and consequences of an exam are associated with higher test anxiety. Of relevance to
us here, several psychological studies provide evidence that female students report higher levels
of test anxiety in higher education (see, for example, Núñez-Peña et al., 2016; Eman et al., 2012;
Backović et al., 2012). Núñez-Peña et al. (2016) propose two possible explanations for gender
difference in relation to test anxiety, both related to social gender roles. One explanation is that
women are under greater social pressure to perform well at university and so are more worried
by exams. The other is that men are less likely to admit their real anxiety as they consider they
should show themselves to be emotionally strong.
2.2 Economic literature
2.2.1 Gender gap on academic performance under pressure
Few studies in the economic literature focus on the role of pressure on gender differences in
scholastic achievement using field data. However, the few that have been undertaken look at
the following sources of pressure: competition, time and the stakes involved, with competitive
pressure – “the stress that one feels when competing” (Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2018, p.2) – being
the most analysed. Azmat et al. (2016) define the pressure a student is under according to the
weight attached to a particular exam within the overall grade for the year, while time pressure
can be defined as the stress students feel as a result of the time constraints they are under to
complete the exam (De Paola and Gioia, 2016).
Studies analysing the gender gap when under competitive pressure have been undertaken
primarily within secondary and high schools, and in relation to university entrance examinations
or national contests. Jurajda and Münich (2011) analyse the gender gap in university admission
rates in the Czech Republic under competitive pressure. Using secondary school results and data
from student performance in the entrance examination, they group each university according
to that year’s admission rate by quartiles. In this way they can define the competitiveness of
the university according to the admission rate. Their results suggest that boys outperform girls
(i.e. they are more likely to be admitted) when applying in a competitive scenario, but there
is no gender gap at less selective universities. The authors control for both skills and subject
of study. Likewise, Ors et al. (2013) use data from HEC Paris, the prestigious business school.
They focus on the performance of students applying to the MSc in Management, one of the best
master’s programs in business in Europe and one offering great job opportunities. They find
that men outperform women in the HEC entrance exam (competitive setting), while the same
women outperform men in the national baccalauréat exam and the first year of the master’s
program (non-competitive settings). Similarly, Pekkarinen (2015) also studies the gender gap
in performance in the Finnish university entrance exams (which use a multiple-choice format)
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and finds the same results as the previous authors: male students outperform female students
on the entrance exams and fewer girls tend to be admitted to university. He also analyses
gender differences in responses to the multiple choice entrance exams and finds that the gap in
performance is because girls omit more items on exams of this type. Finally, in a very recent
study, Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2018) analyse the gender gap in secondary students participating
in a maths contest in Madrid, Spain. The competition comprises two multiple choice exams but
only the best performers in the first stage continue to the second. They find that while there
are no gender differences in maths grades at school, boys outperform girls in the maths contest.
Moreover, the gender gap is greater in the second stage (higher competitive environment) than
in the first (lower competitive pressure).
Empirical studies of the impact of time pressure on educational performance are scare. De
Paola and Gioia (2016) examine how time pressure influences performance at the University of
Calabria when students are given the opportunity to choose between two evaluation schemes at
the beginning of a course: the traditional system or their experimental alternative. Students
opting for the latter were randomly selected into one of two groups. In one group, they sit the
first midterm test with no time pressure and the second under time pressure, while in the other
group the time pressure conditions were reversed. They find that overall students perform worse
under time pressure, but that this effect is due specifically to the underperformance of female
students.
Azmat et al. (2016) analyse gender differences in school performance and university entrance
exams when placed under different levels of pressure. Despite focusing primarily on school
performance, the importance of this study lies in its definition of pressure, which is the same as
that employed herein. As discussed above, they define pressure according to the weight (stake)
of an exam within the overall grade for the year. They use data from the six years of high
school and the entrance exams to university. The midterms during the year are classified as
low-stake, the final exam at the end of each term as medium-stake, the final exam at the end
of the year as high-stake, and entrance exams as super-high-stake. Their results suggest that
females outperform males on all tests, but to a relatively higher degree when the stakes are low.
However, this gender gap disappears in the case of university entrance tests.
2.2.2 Multiple choice format
The multiple choice test is a frequently employed exam format at university. It provides a rapid
system for the evaluation of student knowledge in large class sizes, an objective grading system,
and easy correction (Akyol et al., 2014) while offering high marker reliability (Espinosa and
Gardeazabal, 2010). On the down side, it has been noted that students might adopt a guessing
strategy when answering questions, and that student knowledge is not evaluated properly (Akyol
et al., 2014; Espinosa and Gardeazabal, 2010). To overcome guessing, wrong answers are often
penalized, but this can give rise to other problems. According to Akyol et al. (2014), such
a system is fair if the student either knows the answer or she does not. However, usually,
students doubt among various options and have to decide whether to answer the question or to
skip it. This means that the decision to omit a test item might reflect behavioural differences
such as lower levels of confidence or risk aversion (Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2018), the latter being
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the subject of various studies (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Baldiga, 2014; Espinosa and
Gardeazabal, 2010). This particular characteristic of the multiple choice format benefits students
that are less averse to risk and penalizes those that are more averse to taking risks (Espinosa
and Gardeazabal, 2010).
A number of studies have examined gender differences in answering multiple choice questions.
They suggest that male students normally outperform their female counterparts in this exam
format (Pekkarinen, 2015; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2018) ), while the latter tend to omit more items
than males (Riener and Wagner, 2017; Baldiga, 2014; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2018). Moreover,
the students that omit most items tend to perform worse (Baldiga, 2014; Pekkarinen, 2015) and
to be more risk averse (Espinosa and Gardeazabal, 2013; Akyol et al., 2014).
3 Institutional Setting
The present paper takes advantage of the evaluation system employed on a course entitled
Principles of Taxation (Fonaments de la Fiscalitat in Catalan), which allows us to exploit a
quasi-experimental design to address our research question. It is a mandatory course on the
Bachelor’s Degree in Business Administration taught at the Faculty of Economics and Business
(University of Barcelona). According to the program, students have to take this course in the
first term of their third year.3 The course is an introduction to taxation during which students
are given an initial grounding in the Spanish tax system, i.e. the role of the public sector, general
principles of taxation and specific tax theory.4 It combines theoretical and practical content,
that is, taxation theory with numerical exercises. Our empirical set-up is made possible by (i)
the implementation of a system of continuous assessment (hereinafter, CA) on the course, in
line with the Bologna Process; and, (ii) the specific design adopted for the evaluation system
and its evolution during the academic years analysed.
3.1 Course evaluation system
The Faculty of Economics and Business implemented the Bologna Process in its Bachelor’s
Degree in Business Administration in the 2011/12 academic year. This meant teachers had
to redefine the courses on the Bachelor program, introducing CA and rethinking the teaching
process (Gallardo et al., 2010). Principles of Taxation was no exception and, prior to this date,
the course coordinators opted for the gradual introduction of CA. Thus, two years before the
implementation of the Bologna Process, in the 2009/10 academic year, they introduced a pilot
CA system as an alternative to that of single assessment (SA).
With the adoption of the CA, the course’s evaluation system comprises two periods: first,
the CA and, second, a final exam at the end of the term.5 In the first period, the CA is
conducted at the same time as lectures are delivered. Assessment is based on various (see below
for details) multiple choice tests (30 minutes) taken on a computer during the term covering
3In Spain, with few exceptions, bachelor degrees comprise four academic years.
4For further information about the course and its content (academic year 2017/18), see https://goo.gl/
Z6z1wp
5Note, according to Faculty rules, students can, however, opt out of CA and take the SA, i.e. a single final
exam, constituting the sole form of student assessment for a given course.
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the content introduced between each midterm. In the second period, the final exam is sat at
the end of the term and after lectures have finished. The final exam is divided into two parts:
students, first, take a multiple choice test (30 minutes) and, second, complete an open-question
test (90 minutes). The multiple choice midterm and final tests are largely similar, employing a
similar structure and questions with the same level of difficulty. The small differences that exist
are explained in section 3.2. This system of evaluation, which allows us to compare student
performance when completing very similar multiple choice tests, was in operation until the
2016/17 academic year. In that year the structure of the final exam was changed and the
multiple choice element eliminated. Therefore, the timespan of interest for us comprises the
seven academic years (from 2009/10 to 2015/16) in which the midterm CA test and first part
of the final exam employed very similar multiple choice tests.
Hereinafter, and for the sake of clarity, we refer to the CA multiple choice midterm tests as
midterms and the average grade awarded during this period of CA as the CA grade. The final
exam, that is, the multiple choice questions plus the open-question test, is referred to as the
final exam, where the multiple choice questions on this exam are referred to as the final test
and the grade awarded on that test as the final test grade.6 The grade awarded to the student
for the whole of the final exam is denoted as final exam grade while the whole course grade is
denoted as the overall course grade.
Over these seven academic years, the course coordinators have introduced minor changes
to the evaluation system. To understand fully the pressures faced by students, we summarise
the specific rules and the changes made to them in Table 1. The Table 1 is divided into three
main sections: rules applied during the period of CA, rules governing the final exam and rules
for computing the overall course grade. Note that the number of midterms fell over the years
from four to two. During the first five years (2009/10 to 2013/14), students could discard the
midterm with the worst grade (if they had opted to sit them all). In the last two years, with
just two midterms, this possibility was eliminated. The CA grade, therefore, is computed as the
average grade of all midterms, each with the same weight.
The final test was eliminatory for the first four years of our study. This means that students
had to fulfil at least one of two requirements: (i) score 4 or more on the final test or, (ii)
have a CA grade of 5 or more. If neither requirement was met, the second part of the final
exam, the open questions, was not marked. As Table 1 shows, this rule was eliminated in the
2013/14 academic year and the final test was no longer eliminatory. Finally, certain changes
have been made in computing the overall course grade. First, the weight of the CA grade has
been progressively increased from 10 to 40%. This reflects the decision to gradually introduce
CA, allowing the coordinators to experiment with the course design in readiness for the official
implementation of the Bologna Process. Later, in the 2013/14 academic year, a minimum final
exam grade of 4 was required for the CA grade to be taken into account in the overall course
grade. Students scoring less than 4 were deemed to have failed the course. Finally, the overall
course grade was computed with the weighted average between CA grade and the final exam
grade, in line with the rules outlined above. This rule was changed in the 2014/15 academic
year and the overall course grade was computed as the maximum between the final exam grade,
6We do not specifically refer to the second part of the final exam (the open-question section) as it plays no
role in our study.
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on the one hand, and the weighted average between the CA grade and the final exam grade, on
the other.
Table 1: Evaluation system for Principles of Taxation
CA Final Exam Overall Course Grade
Academic No. Average Test % CA Minimum Overall
Year Midterms Grade eliminatory grade F.Exam* grade
2009/10 4 3 highest Yes 10% No CA & F.Exam
2010/11 4 3 highest Yes 20% No CA & F.Exam
2011/12 3 2 highest Yes 30% No CA & F.Exam
2012/13 3 2 highest Yes 40% No CA & F.Exam
2013/14 3 2 highest No 40% Yes CA & F.Exam
2014/15 2 the 2 No 40% Yes max{F.Exam,CA&F.Exam}
2015/16 2 the 2 No 40% Yes max{F.Exam,CA&F.Exam}
(*) Students had to obtain a minimum final exam grade of 4 for the CA grade to be taken into account for the overall
course grade.
3.2 Quasi-experimental setting
The specific evaluation system employed by the course Principles of Taxation over these seven
years allows us to exploit a quasi-experimental situation with regards to the test pressure faced
by students, where test pressure is defined as the increased necessity of performing well on a
test due to the increasing weight of that examination within the overall course grade.7 In other
words, a good performance on an exam that has more impact on the overall course grade (high
stakes) is more important than an exam of lesser impact (low stakes). Therefore, students feel
under greater pressure to perform well on a high-stakes exam given the graver consequences of
obtaining a poor grade or of failing. Based on this definition, we define two levels of pressure
in our main setting: the low pressure scenario corresponds to the midterms (CA) while the
high pressure scenario corresponds to the final test. Recall that the weight of the CA grade is
lower than that of the final exam in the overall course grade (see Table 1). Depending on the
academic year students sit a different number of midterms, the weight varying between 3.33 and
20%. However, the final test (multiple choice) accounts for 33% of the final exam grade (i.e.
between 20 and 30% of the overall course grade). Thus, the pressure associated with each of
the midterms is lower than the pressure associated with the final test. Additionally, students
are given two hours to complete the two parts of the final exam, which means the pressure
associated with the final test (the first part of this exam) is high, being an important part of
this evaluation stage.
7There is some debate as to what constitutes a quasi-experiment and what methodology should be employed.
In our main setting, our quasi-experiment involves students taking very similar tests in the same year, but exposed
to different levels of pressure. We do not, therefore, define either treatment or control groups, as the same students
are exposed to the different (high-low) pressure scenarios. This rich setting allows us to compile panel data with
all those students sitting the tests over the term. Therefore, we use the term quasi-experiment as this natural
setting allows us to isolate the role played by pressure in the students’ academic performance, while ensuring no
effects are attributable to exam format, content or test difficulty or to different groups of students. As such, we
can isolate gender differences in test performance under varying degrees of pressure in a similar way to a designed
experiment.
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Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that a number of specific rules included within
the evaluation system determined the pressure to which students were subject. There are three
additional characteristics that help to further reduce the pressure faced in the CA part of the
course (the first period). First, the fact that students sit several midterms has the effect of
lowering the level of risk associated with the CA grade. Second, in five of the seven years
studied, students could discard their worst midterm grade (assuming they sat them all). Third,
in the last two years, the overall course grade is computed as the maximum between the final
exam grade, on the one hand, and the weighted average between the CA grade and the final
exam grade, on the other. This means that a poor CA performance can be rectified in the final
exam. These three characteristics mean that the associated risk can be diversified over the CA
and so students face less pressure when sitting the midterms. In contrast, the final exam (the
second period) is defined as a high pressure scenario due to the greater weight attached to it in
the overall course grade. Moreover, during the first four academic years, the eliminatory nature
of the final test made the pressure even higher, given that the second part of the final exam was
not marked and the student would automatically fail the whole course. In the following three
years, the minimum grade required on the final exam represented pressure to students for the
whole final exam. A comparison of the two rules suggests the former (elimination) was a source
of greater pressure on the final test than the minimum grade requirement.8
These modifications to the system of evaluation represent differences over the academic years
in the pressure students face in completing the CA and when sitting the final test. For this
reason, we divided the timespan into two intervals of what we consider to be more homogeneous
levels of pressure: 2009/10-2012/13 and 2013/14-2015/16 (as indicated by the dashed line in
Table 1). By so doing, we are able to examine test pressure attributable to specific rules of
evaluation and, as such, this represents our secondary source of test pressure. Moreover, it also
allows us to examine the main setting which controls for differences in the pressure faced by
students over successive academic years. We define the first interval, 2009/10-2012/13, as being
of high pressure and the second, 2013/14-2015/16, as being of low pressure. On the one hand,
the incentives to perform well in the CA component are higher in the first interval than in the
second due to the eliminatory nature of the final test in that first period (greater pressure)
and because of the formula employed to compute the overall course grade in the second (less
pressure). On the other hand, the incentives to perform well in the final test are higher in the
first interval than in the second due to the eliminatory nature of this test and also to the greater
weight given to the final exam grade in the overall course grade.9
To sum up, we first define our main setting as the pressure attributable to the weight of a
8Student questionnaires over the years have identified the ‘eliminatory rule’ as a key source of pressure and
have expressed their rejection of it. Yet, the ‘minimum grade rule’ for the CA grade to be taken into account has
not been perceived by students to be a major source of pressure, given their perception that they can pass the
course by performing well on the final exam.
9We are aware that this division in two homogenous intervals of pressure is not perfect, but it offers a close
approximation. The number of midterms and the weight of the CA grade are not exactly the same in the first
interval but, despite this, the incentives to perform well in the CA component remain high and constant given the
fact that students do not need to score a minimum of four on the final test in case of passing the CA. The weight
of the final exam in this interval is high, given that not being entitled to have the second part marked means
automatically failing the whole course. In the second interval, the system employed in the first year presents some
differences with the other two, but it is more similar to the system employed in the last two years than it is to
those in the first interval. In any case, the use of year-fixed effects should help eradicate these small differences.
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test in the overall course grade. Thus, we define the CA as low pressure, due to the lower weight
of the midterms, and the final test as high pressure, due to its higher weight. This setting can
be further defined as a sequential game of two periods in which students first sit low pressure
midterms and then sit a high pressure final test. Then, we define a secondary (heterogeneous)
setting in which the test pressure varies according to specific rules of evaluation which require
students to perform better. Here, we define the first interval as high pressure and the second as
low pressure. We should stress that in the main setting we compare the same students exposed
to different levels of pressure, i.e. the same student first completes the CA and then goes on to
sit the final test. In the secondary setting we compare different cohorts of students exposed to
different levels of pressure.
Midterms and the final test are comparable, insofar as they contain the same kind of questions
and share a similar structure. Each multiple choice item comprises four options of which only
one is correct and three incorrect. Students score 1 point for each correct question and lose 0.25
of a point for each wrong question, while omitting the item altogether has no effect on their score.
Item difficulty on the midterms and final test is the same given that the questions are designed in
the same way by the same teachers. However, while the midterms are computer-based, the final
test is completed on paper. Moreover, on the midterms, students have 30 minutes to answer ten
multiple choice questions plus two or three small exercises in which they must solve a problem by
entering a number into a box. However, in the final exam, students have 30 minutes to answer
20 multiple choice questions.
Our setting is characterized by a number of factors that allow us to effectively investigate
gender differences in academic performance when students are exposed to different levels of
pressure. First, tests are corrected by machine, not by teachers. More specifically, midterms are
corrected by computer with students taking the exam on the university web page in a computer
classroom while the paper-based exams are corrected by machine. This allows us to avoid any
possible teacher gender-bias or bias towards specific subgroups of students, as some authors have
suggested (see, for example, Falch and Naper, 2013; Goldin and Rouse, 2000). Second, students
sit similar exams: that is, multiple choice format, comprising the same kind of questions with a
similar level of difficulty. Thus, the effects that arise from comparing completely different types
of test or degrees of test difficulty are not a concern here, though we are aware of small differences
between them. Third, we focus essentially on students who complete the CA component and
that sit the final exam. This allows us to compare how the behaviour and performance of the
same individuals change under different levels of pressure. However, we also examine our main
setting with all students enrolled on the course, that is, we also include students opting for
single assessment (SA) and students who while completing the CA component decide not to sit
the final exam. Additionally, we also examine this main setting including those students who
complete neither the CA component nor the final exam. We should stress that the group of
students who complete the CA component is not exactly the same as the group that sits the
final exam. Given this situation, we analyse the possible issue of self-selection in each period
separately.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study uses data from two sources: administrative and course data. First, the adminis-
trative data was provided by the University of Barcelona’s Faculty of Economics and Business.
They contain full demographic and academic information for all students enrolled on the course
Principles of Taxation over the seven academic years. Second, the course data were provided by
the Economics of Taxation Teaching Innovation Group (GIDEI, from the acronym in Catalan).
It contains a full set of information about the grades and groups.
4.1 Administrative data
The administrative data comprise two sorts of student information: demographic and academic.
The demographic information includes student gender, date of birth, country of birth, province of
birth, city of birth, nationality and student ID. The academic data contains general information
about the whole undergraduate program and specific information for the year that the student
was enrolled on Principles of Taxation. The general information includes the student’s access
path to the degree, university access grade, the year of starting the degree and the Grade
Point Average (GPA) for the whole undergraduate program. The specific information includes
the academic year in which the student took Principles of Taxation, the number of cumulative
credits passed – including those passed in that year, the courses the student was enrolled on that
year (name, group, term and final grade) and whether that year the student won a scholarship.
The Faculty’s administrative data allow us to compute rich vectors of control variables for
individual and group characteristics.
4.2 Course data
The course data comprise two sorts of information: grades and group information. The grade
information includes student ID, academic year, grade of each midterm, average CA grade,
final test grade, detailed information on the final test (number of questions answered correctly,
incorrectly and omitted), the grade for each question in the open-question part, the grade for
the final exam and the overall course grade. The group information also contains details about
the group teaching schedule, the teachers assigned to each group, teacher gender and language
of instruction (English being employed with some groups). The course data provide us with all
the student grades plus details for computing the control variables for group characteristics.
4.3 Sample and descriptive statistics
The database covers the timespan between 2009/10 and 2015/16, i.e. seven academic years.
According to the administrative data, 5,464 students enrolled on the first term course, Principles
of Taxation, during this time. Students enrolled in groups taught in English were removed given
the very different format of their evaluation system compared to that of the Catalan/Spanish-
taught groups. The first two academic years, 2009/10 and 2010/11, correspond to the pre-
Bologna program. Those students who at that time were in the final year of their degree or
had registered for all the credits to obtain the degree, were removed from the sample, since for
these students, the eliminatory rule applied to the multiple choice test did not affect them. This
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would have meant their adopting a different strategic behaviour and having to face completely
different levels of pressure on the CA component and final test. Therefore, we were left with
5,013 students, i.e. 92% of all students enrolled on Principles of Taxationin the seven-year
period. Figure A.1 in Appendix B shows the number of students who opted for CA or SA, the
number of students who sat the midterms but did not sit the final exam and the number of
students who sat neither midterms nor the final exam.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the CA and final test grades
CA Grade (Low Pressure) Final Test Grade (High Pressure)
Male Female Statistic Male Female Statistic
Full Sample (N=5,013)
N 2,207 2,085 2,253 2,065
Percentage (%) 51.4 48.6 52.2 47.8
Hao : Pr(Mi) = 0.5 -1.862*** -2.861***
Hbo : Pr(Mi) = Pr(Fi) -2.634*** -4.046***
Mean Test 4.73 5.03 -4.37*** 4.89 4.78 1.92*
Median Test 4.94 5.26 12.64*** 4.9 4.88 2.65
KS Test 0.071*** 0.037
10th percentile 1.38 1.69 2.25 2.38
25th percentile 2.88 3.51 3.5 3.5
50th percentile 4.94 5.26 4.9 4.88
75th percentile 6.5 6.69 6.25 6
90th percentile 7.69 7.71 7.5 7.25
Balanced Sample (N=3,912)
N 2,021 1,891
Percentage (%) 51.7 48.3
Hao : Pr(Mi) = 0.5 -2.079**
Hbo : Pr(Mi) = Pr(Fi) -2.94***
Mean Test 4.94 5.25 -4.46*** 4.96 4.83 2.07**
Median Test 5.19 5.44 13.96*** 5 4.88 1.83
KS Test 0.076*** 0.038
10th percentile 1.63 2.13 2.38 2.38
25th percentile 3.38 3.94 3.63 3.6
50th percentile 5.19 5.44 5 4.88
75th percentile 6.63 6.82 6.25 6.13
90th percentile 7.81 7.82 7.5 7.25
Notes: Full sample: 4,292 students opted for CA and 4,318 sat the final exam. In line with the definition of a
balanced sample, students opting for CA and final test are the same. Therefore, the number of males and females, their
percentages and Tests a and b are the same for CA and the final test. The null hypothesis for Test a (Hao ) is that the
proportion of males (Mi) is equal to 50% and for Test b (H
b
o) that the proportion of males (Mi) and females (Fi) are
equal, where i denotes the CA or final test sample. Z-statistic for Test a and b. The null hypothesis for the Mean Test
is equal mean grades across the gender (unequal variances), t-statistic. The Median Test is a non-parametric 2-sample
test in which the null hypothesis is equal medians across gender, chi-squared test statistic with continuity correction.
The KS Test is the Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test in which the null hypothesis is equal grades distribution
(CA or final test, respectively) across gender, D-statistic. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and
* the 10% level.
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Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the full sample and the balanced sample.10
The full sample comprises 5,013 students, while the balanced sample comprises all students who
opt for CA and sit the final test, i.e. 3,912 students. In the case of the full sample, 85.6%
of the students opt for CA and 86.1% take the final exam. The percentage of male students
opting for CA is 51.4%, which is significantly different from the percentage of female students.
Likewise, the percentage of male students sitting the final exam is 52.2%, again significantly
different from the percentage of female students. Female students score 0.3 points (out of ten)
more on the CA grade than male students (significant at 1% level), but score 0.11 points (out
of ten) less on the final test (significant at 10% level). In terms of percentiles, the gender grade
gap in favour of female students falls at higher percentiles in the case of CA. However, in the
final test, while the gender gap is in favour of female students in the first decile it is zero in the
25th percentile. From the median upward, a gender gap in favour of male students emerges and
increases at higher percentiles. In the case of the balanced sample, the descriptive statistics are
quite similar to those for the full sample, but grades are, in general, higher. Female students
score 0.31 points more on the CA grade (significant at 1% level), while male students score 0.13
points more on the final test (significant at the 5% level). Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the
same descriptive statistics for the first interval (2009/10 - 2012/13, high pressure) and second
interval (2013/14 - 2015/16, low pressure) in the case of the balanced sample. The main finding
that male students perform worse in comparison with female students in the CA component,
but perform better in the final test remains the same. However, there are differences across the
intervals which highlight the importance of taking into account this in the empirical analysis.
In Appendix B, Figure A.2 shows the kernel distributions of the CA grade and final test grade
by gender and Figure A.3 shows the kernel distributions of the CA grade and final test grade
by gender in each interval.
5 Empirical Strategy
The identification strategy involves analysing the gender gap in student performance when ex-
posed to different levels of test pressure while enrolled on the course Principles of Taxation. For
this purpose, our strategy can be broken down into two main parts. In each part, we give our
database a different data structure: an independently pooled cross-sectional structure and a
panel data structure. Following the definitions of Wooldridge (2012), in the first part, we have
a pooled cross-sectional dataset in which we observe the CA grade and the final test grade over
seven academic years. It is important to highlight that the students observed each year are
different and that the CA grade and final test grade are different variables in the dataset. This
means we observe grades obtained at different points of time (years) from different cohorts of
students. The main advantage of this data structure is that observations across years are inde-
pendently distributed (Wooldridge, 2012). In the second part, we reshape the database giving
it a panel data structure and include all students who take both the CA and the final test. This
means we follow the same student across the two periods. This sequential setting of two periods
(students first complete the CA and then sit the final test) allows us to build a two-period panel
10Following the notation used by Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2018), the balanced sample comprises students opting
both for CA and sitting the final test.
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data with the balanced sample. In this data structure, the time variable is each period, i.e. the
CA and the final test. Students complete the CA in p = 1 (i.e. first period) and, then, they
take the final test in p = 2 (i.e. second period). Notice that academic year is not the time
variable in this data structure, rather it is a student characteristic. For this reason, we control
for year-group fixed effects. Finally, note that the CA and final test grades now form part of
the same dependent variable denoted grade.11
We exploit the advantages of these two data structures. On the one hand, the pooled cross-
sectional structure allows us to analyse the two grades separately, i.e. the difference between a
low (CA) and high pressure scenario (final test). Second, this allows us to examine differences
in the gender gap across the distribution of grades in each situation. Third, we can analyse the
possibility of sample selection in each case. Self-selection may arise from those students who
have not taken either the CA or the exam, and from those students who have not taken any
exam at all. On the other hand, the two-period panel data structure allows us to estimate the
same gender gaps in the balanced sample, but here we use another methodology. This allows
us, moreover, to analyse whether the gender gaps in the CA and the final test are statistically
different. Due to the strength of this second setting, a heterogeneous analysis is provided to
examine differences between the two homogenous academic year intervals defined in section 3.2.
This heterogeneity analysis seeks to examine the second source of test pressure: evaluation rules
that increase test pressure.
The whole empirical strategy aims at identifying the causal effect between a student’s gender
and their grade – controlling for individual characteristics, group characteristics and year fixed
effects – and how this causal effect varies according to the level of pressure faced. Note that
the allocation of students across groups is not random. When students enrol on their courses
at the beginning of the academic year, they choose the group they wish to join. Priority in the
enrolment process is determined by the student’s GPA: those with the highest averages having
first choice. For this reason, we need to control for peer-group and teacher effects. Indeed, to
ensure robustness, we employ three strategies to control for these group and year effects.
Pooled Cross-Section Model. We follow the methodology outlined in Ors et al. (2013) in-
troducing a number of modifications to strengthen the model. In line with their two-stage
admission procedure, we estimate CA and final test grades separately by quantile regressions
(QR) for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles with bootstrapped standard errors
with 1,000 replications and we compare the gender gap between the two main scenarios. We
take the same percentiles as these authors so as to (i) compare the median coefficient with the
ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient, and (ii) estimate the coefficients in the top and bottom
deciles. Our contributions include the fact that we also estimate the regressions by OLS, we
analyse self-selection into CA and the final test using the Heckman technique and we have more
control variables.12 The baseline empirical model estimates the grade on student gender and on
the control variables of individual characteristics. Note that here we regress the CA grade and
11Recall we use the average continuous assessment grade, the CA grade, as the grade for the first period.
12Note that Ors et al. (2013) analyse the entrance exams for a Master’s program at an expensive, prestigious
business school – a special situation with a high payoff. Students are under very high competitive pressure in
order to go through to the second stage of the examination and then to be accepted on to the program. However,
in our setting, we deal with a compulsory course on an undergraduate degree taught at a public university. Hence,
the scenario is one that all university students face many times during higher education.
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final test grade separately, so they constitute two different dependent variables. The econometric
specification can be expressed as follows:
yigt = β0 + β1 · Femaleigt + β2 ·Xigt + εigt (1)
where the dependent variable yigt denotes the grade (either y = CA grade or y = final test grade)
obtained by student i in group g in the academic year t, Femaleigt is a dummy variable which
takes a value of 1 if the student is female and 0 if male, Xigt is the vector of individual controls
and εigt is the error term. We estimate the baseline model using three different strategies to
control for year and group fixed effects. We first regress Eq.(1) with control variables of group
characteristics (Zgt) and year fixed effects (µt); second, we regress the baseline model with group
fixed effects (µg) and year fixed effects (µt); and, third, we estimate Eq.(1) by adding year-group
fixed effect (µgt).
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Two-Period Panel Data Baseline Model. This setting is similar to that presented in Iriberri
and Rey-Biel (2018), but again we introduce a number of modifications to strengthen the
model.14 We estimate the final test grade on student gender by OLS with period fixed effect
(pooled OLS), random effects (RE) and student fixed effects (FE). The econometric specification
estimated by pooled OLS and RE can be expressed as follows:
Gradeigtp = α0+α1·Femaleigt+α2·Final Testp+α3·Femaleigt·Final Testp+α4·Xigt+µgt+εigtp
(2)
where the dependent variable Gradeigtp denotes the grade obtained by student i in group g in
academic year t and during period p, where p = 1 refers to CA and p = 2 to the final test and
Final Testp is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if it is the second period (final test)
or 0 if the first (CA).
The econometric specification estimated by student FE can be expressed:
Gradeigtp = α0 + α2 · Final Testp + α3 · Femaleitg · Final Testp + µit + µgt + εitgp (3)
where µit is the student fixed effect. In the heterogeneity analysis, we estimate the following
specification by pooled OLS and RE:
Gradeigtp = α0 + α1 · Femaleigt + α2 · Final Testp + α3 · Femaleigt · Final Testp+
+ α4 · 1st Intervaligt + α5 · 1st Intervaligt · Femaleigt + α6 ·Xigt + µgt + εigtp
(4)
13The model that includes the year-group fixed effect is the most restrictive specification, allowing us to control
for peer and teacher effects and year effects at the same time.
14In the setting described by Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2018), students face elimination at the end of the first
stage depending on their performance and are, as such, subject to competitive pressure. However, in our setting,
students are free to decide to participate in the second period (the exam), with high incentives to do so. These
students are not subject to competitive pressure and do not face the pressure of being eliminated during the
first period; rather, they face the pressure of either passing or failing the course and satisfying their own grade
goal, i.e. they are subject to test pressure. Moreover, we focus on those students who take both the CA and
the final test, i.e. 78% of our sample. In addition, Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2018) only employ the students’ school
characteristics and maths grades at school. In our case, we employ individual and group characteristics plus seven
years of information.
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where 1st Intervaligt is the dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the student belongs to
the first interval (high pressure in academic years 2009/10 - 2012/13) and 0 to the second (low
pressure in academic years 2013/14 - 2015/16).
The control variables for individual and group characteristics used in all the empirical models
are detailed in Table A.2 in Appendix A. The individual variables are age, nationality, university
access grade 15, number of courses enrolled on in the first term, average grade obtained that first
term, and status as scholarship holder and repeat student. The access grade proxies (direct and
indirectly) student ability and family background and so allows us to control for the students’
unobserved academic abilities.16 Moreover, the number of courses enrolled on that term and the
average grade obtained allow us to proxy extra information for that term: for instance, whether
the student is working hard, subject to an extra effort by taking on more courses, their personal
circumstances during that term or whether enrolled on a double degree program. In short, any
circumstance that might lead a student to perform better or worse. The group variables are
morning/afternoon group, percentage of female students in the group, gender of the teacher,
average age of group, group’s average access grade, average number of courses enrolled on by
group and the average grade obtained in that term’s courses by group.
6 Results
The results are presented in three subsections. The first refers to the pooled cross-sectional
structure, in which we present the main results and the sample selection analysis. The second
refers to the two-period panel data structure, in which we present the main results and the
heterogeneity analysis. The third subsection presents the possible mechanisms underpinning
the results.
6.1 Pooled cross-sectional structure
6.1.1 Main results
Table 3 reports the results of the main setting in which the dependent variable is either the CA
grade (low pressure) or the final test grade (high pressure). Each grade variable is standardized
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at year level. The columns are the three augmented
baseline models in each period and the rows are the coefficients of the variable Female from the
OLS (first row) and for each regression from the QR (next five rows).
15This information is not available for a small number of students (190 out of 3.912, that is, 4.86%) as they
accessed via a different path.
16For example, Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2018) proxy a student’s mathematical ability with their maths grades at
school, Ors et al. (2013) proxy student ability with the ranking of the preparation school and Jurajda and Münich
(2011) control student ability with test scores on entrance examinations.
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Table 3: Gender gap in the CA grade and final test - balanced sample
CA Grade (Low Pressure) Final Test Grade (High Pressure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ordinary Least Square
Female 0.034 0.037 0.032 -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.081***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Quantile Regressions
τ = 0.10 -0.008 0.008 -0.012 -0.023 -0.0053 -0.013
(0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054)
τ = 0.25 0.056 0.062* 0.075** -0.024 -0.059 -0.028
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037)
τ = 0.50 0.044 0.067** 0.037 -0.124*** -0.112*** -0.119***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038)
τ = 0.75 0.039 0.034 0.026 -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.091**
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042)
τ = 0.90 0.0017 -0.025 -0.030 -0.170*** -0.166*** -0.148***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044)
N 3,722 3,722 3,722 3,722 3,722 3,722
Adj.R2OLS 0.331 0.333 0.342 0.307 0.310 0.321
Individual var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group var. Yes No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Group FE No Yes No No Yes No
Year-Group FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable measures CA grade in columns (1) to (3) and final test grade in columns (4) to (6). Each
dependent grade variable is standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at year level. The coefficients shown
are the female dummy variable (1 if female student) for the OLS and QR. Standard errors, clustered at year-group level,
for the OLS and bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 replications for the QR. Standard errors are in parentheses
and *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 190 observations were discarded because
they have no university access grade (students access degree via another path) or there is no average grade for the first
term (students who take no courses despite enrolling). Individual variables: age, nationality, university access grade,
number of courses enrolled on in the first term, average grade obtained that first term, and status as scholarship holder
and repeat student. Group variables: morning/afternoon group, percentage of female students in the group, gender of
the teacher, average age of group, group’s average access grade, average number of courses enrolled on by group and
the average grade obtained in that term’s courses by group.
The OLS results show that female students outperform male students by around 0.03 stan-
dard deviations in the CA grade (first period - low pressure), though this difference is not
statistically significant. However, when the same students sit the final test, male students out-
perform female students by around 0.08 standard deviations (second period - high pressure),
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, male and female students perform at
a similar level when subject to the low pressure associated with a lower stake in the overall
course grade. However, a gender gap emerges in favour of male students when subject to the
high pressure associated with a higher stake in the overall course grade. We also estimate these
specifications when the dependent variable is the grade of the first midterm in the CA (see
results in Panel A, Table B.1 in Appendix A). The importance of this midterm lies in the fact
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that its test content is similar across the years and is common to all seven years. Moreover, as
it is the first test, it is more likely that almost all the students will sit it. In this case, female
students outperform male students by around 0.06 standard deviations in the OLS estimates,
statistically significant at the 10% level, and around 0.08–0.09 standard deviations in the 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles in the QR estimates, statistically significant at levels between 1 and
10%.
The QR estimates allow us to examine differences in the gender gap across the grade distri-
bution in each period. Over the CA grade distribution (first period - low pressure), in columns
(1) to (3), we find no gender grade gap across percentiles, albeit with a few exceptions. In the
case of the final test (second period - high pressure), in columns (4) to (6), male students out-
perform female students in the median, 75th percentile and 90th percentile, being statistically
significant at the 1% level, while there are no significant differences in the first decile and the
25th percentile. Coefficients are similar across the three augmented specifications. Moreover,
the gender gap is higher for the top students (last decile) by around 0.16–0.17 standard devi-
ations. Comparing the average effect with the median effect, the gender gap in the median is
around 0.10 –0.12 standard deviations vs. the 0.08 in the OLS. In addition, we also estimate
these specifications with the final test grade as our dependent variable, including the CA grade
as an independent variable (see results in Panel B, Table B.1 in Appendix A). Since it is a
two-period sequence, the CA grade gives more information about student performance on the
final test. The results and interpretation are the same, and no significant changes emerge.17
6.1.2 Sample selection analysis
In this section we analyse whether the characteristics that lead students not to sit midterms or
the final test are correlated with their gender. First, we estimate the same regressions as in the
previous section but using the full sample. Second, we take into account those students who do
not sit either the CA or the final test (sample selection approach).
Table 4 reports the estimates using the same specifications as those in Table 3 above, but for
the full sample (that is, with all the students completing the CA component and all the students
who sit the final test). The results are very similar to those obtained with the balanced sample.
Female students outperform male students in the CA by around 0.03 standard deviations (which
is not statistically significant), and male students outperform female students in the final test
by around 0.08 standard deviations, statistically significant at the 1% level. The results from
the QR are very similar to those obtained in the balanced sample, but with a notable difference.
In the CA grade, the median estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level. Therefore,
taking into account all the students who complete the CA, a gender gap emerges in favour of
female students in the median (around 0.06 standard deviation), while there are no differences
in the OLS estimates.
17The pooled cross-sectional structure uses the estimates without CA grade as our independent variable, because
in the sample selection this variable cannot be added due to the nature of the analysis.
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Table 4: Gender gap in the CA and final test grades - full sample
CA Grade (Low Pressure) Final Test Grade (High Pressure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ordinary Least Square
Female 0.034 0.037 0.032 -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.081***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Quantile Regressions
τ = 0, 1 -0.040 -0.035 -0.005 -0.025 -0.033 -0.013
(0.051) (0.050) (0.047) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
τ = 0, 25 0.038 0.045 0.066* -0.032 -0.0572 -0.036
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.0368) (0.037)
τ = 0, 5 0.062* 0.069** 0.054* -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.114***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037)
τ = 0, 75 0.048 0.048 0.027 -0.103*** -0.098*** -0.089**
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039)
τ = 0, 9 -0.008 -0.025 -0.010 -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.163***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044)
N 4,070 4,070 4,070 4,100 4,100 4,100
Adj.R2OLS 0.355 0.357 0.364 0.303 0.305 0.316
Individual var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group var. Yes No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Group FE No Yes No No Yes No
Year-Group FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable measures the CA grade in columns (1) to (3) and the final test grade in columns (4) to
(6). Each dependent grade variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at year level. The coefficients
shown are the female dummy variable (1 if a female student) for the OLS and QR. Standard errors, clustered at year-
group level, for the OLS and bootstrapped standard errors with 1.000 replications for the QR. Standard errors are in
parentheses and *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. 4,292 students take the
CA component, 222 observations being eliminated because the students had no university access grade (having accessed
the degree via another path) or no average grade for the first term (students who enrol but then fail to take any course).
4,318 take the final exam, 218 observations being eliminated for the same reasons as above. Individual variables: age,
nationality, university access grade, number of courses enrolled on in the first term, average grade obtained that first
term, and status as scholarship holder and repeat student. Group variables: morning/afternoon group, percentage of
female students in the group, gender of the teacher, average age of group, group’s average access grade, average number
of courses enrolled on by group and the average grade obtained in that term’s courses by group.
We then analyse the gender gap in the CA grade taking into account those students who do
not complete the CA component and the gender gap in the final test grade taking into account
those students who do not sit the final test. To do so, we conduct the two-step procedure tech-
nique developed by Heckman (1979) to correct for sample selection. The first step estimates the
probability of completing the CA (or final test), and the second step regresses the specifications
defined in the empirical strategy, but correcting for this sample selection. We denote the first
step ‘selection equation’ and the second as ‘augmented model’. Table 5 reports the Female
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estimates from the two Heckman steps for both the CA and final test grades. In the CA grade,
the selection equation shows that female students are more likely to complete the CA than male
students; therefore, there is sample selection over the first period of the term. Once this selection
bias is corrected, the gender gap in the case of CA is around 0.10 standard deviations in favour
of female students, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the selection equa-
tion for the final test grade does not show any gender differences in the probability of taking the
final test. Therefore, there is no selection bias in the final test, and the gender gap in favour of
male students estimated with the balanced and full sample remains unchanged at around 0.08
standard deviations.
Table 5: Gender gap in the CA grade and final test - Heckman
CA Grade (Low Pressure) Final Test Grade (High Pressure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Augmented Model
Female 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.090*** -0.081*** -0.085*** -0.082***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Selection Equation
Female 0.172*** 0.181*** 0.167*** -0.061 -0.061 -0.066
(0.054) (0.047) (0.048) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
N 4,668 4,668 4,668 4,668 4,668 4,668
Individual var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group var. Yes No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Group FE No Yes No No Yes No
Year-Group FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in the second step (Augmented B. Model) measures the CA grade in columns (1) to
(3) and the final test grade in columns (4) to (6). The dependent variable in the first step (Selection Equation) is a
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the student takes the CA component (or the final test) and 0 otherwise. Each
dependent grade variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at year level. The coefficients shown are
the female dummy variable (1 if a female student) from the selection equation (first step) and the augmented baseline
model (second step). The explanatory variables of the selection equation are the same as those in each augmented
baseline model, but we add the university GPA to the CA grade, and the university GPA and a dummy variable
capturing whether the student completed the CA component or not to the final test grade. This is because the selection
equation must have at least one different variable to those included in the 2nd step equation. Moreover, in the final test
grade, we control for the student having previously completed, or otherwise, the CA component. Heckman standard
errors are in parentheses and *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. The full
sample comprises 5,013 students, 345 observations being eliminated because the students had no university access grade
(having accessed the degree via another path) or no average grade for the first term (students who enrol but then fail
to take any course). Of the 4,668 students, 598 do not complete the CA component and 568 do not sit the final exam.
6.2 Two-period panel data structure
6.2.1 Main Results
Table 6 shows the estimates for the main setting when the data are structured as two-period
panel data. With this structure, the dummy variable Female identifies the gender gap in the
CA grade (1st period - low pressure) and Female · Final Test reveals the difference in the
gender gap between the CA and the final test grades. Thus, Female + Female · Final Test
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identifies the gender gap in the final test grade (2nd period - high pressure). For the sake of
simplicity, we only show results with year-group FE, the most restrictive manner of controlling
for peer-teacher and year effects. The pooled OLS and RE estimates, columns (1) and (2), show
that female students outperform male students in the first period by around 0.043 standard
deviations, which is not statistically significant. However, the gender gap is reversed in the
second period (final test) by 0.134 standard deviations, and is statistically significant at the
1% level. This means that male students outperform female students in the final test (second
period) by around 0.091 standard deviations (0.043 - 0.134).18 The FE estimates, column (3),
show exactly the same coefficients and significance for the interaction Female · Final Test.19
In the FE model, we cannot compute the gender gap in each period since the variables do not
vary over time (i.e. over the two periods), such as Female, are controlled for by the individual
FE. Nevertheless, we compute this model as it is the most restrictive one due to the individual
FE. This allows us to control for possible omitted variables such as individual, group or year
variables and to verify the coefficients Final Test and Female · Final Test.
These estimates confirm the previous results (section 6.1.1) from the pooled cross-sectional
structure. Table 7 compares the results obtained with the two data structures used. On the
one hand, the pooled cross-sectional structure estimates a gender gap of around 0.032 standard
deviations for the CA grade, while the two-period panel estimates a 0.043 standard deviation,
neither of which is statistically significant. On the other hand, the gender gap estimated is -
0.086 and -0.091 standard deviations for the final test, respectively, both statistically significant
at the 1% level. This indicates that the results from the two-period panel data are completely
aligned with those from the pooled cross-sectional structure. Moreover, with the two-period
panel model, both pooled OLS and RE present very similar estimates and, therefore, a very
similar gender gap.
18We estimate the same specifications, but instead we define the dummy period variable as CA, which takes
a value of 1 if it refers to the first period (CA) and 0 if it refers to the second period (final test). In this case,
the dummy variable Female reveals the gender gap in the final test grade (2nd period - high pressure) and
Female · CA reveals the difference in the gender gap between the CA and the final test. Thus, Female plus
Female · CA identifies the gender gap in the CA grade (1st period - low pressure). Table B.2 in Appendix A
shows the results. The coefficient Female is -0.091, and statistically significant at the 1% level, i.e. the gender
gap in the final test. CA and Female ·CA are the same as in Table 6 but, as expected, they present the opposite
sign.
19Note that individual and group variables and year-group FE are constant through the two periods, thus they
are omitted due to individual FE.
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Table 6: Gender Gap - Main Setting




Final Test -0.0189 -0.0189 -0.0189
(0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0375)
Female · Final Test -0.1337*** -0.1337*** -0.1337***
(0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0372)
N 7,444 7,444 7,444
Number of Ind. 3,722 3,722 3,722
Individual var. Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-Group FE Yes Yes No
Notes: The dependent variable measures student performance over the two periods: the CA grade in the first period
and final test grade in the second. The dependent variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at
each period and year level. The female dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the student is female and 0 otherwise.
Final Test takes a value of 1 if the grade refers to the second period (final test grade) and 0 if it refers to the first
period (CA grade). Standard errors, clustered at year-group level, are in parentheses and *** denotes significance at
the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. Balanced sample.
Table 7: Gender gap - pooled cross-section vs two-period panel data
Pooled Cross-Section Two-Period Panel Data
CA Grade Final Test Grade Pooled OLS RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CA Gender Gap (low pressure) 0.032 - 0.0427 0.0427
Final Test Gender Gap (high pressure) - -0.086*** -0.091*** -0.091***
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) refer to the pooled cross-sectional structure presented in section 6.1.1 while columns (3)
and (4) refer to the two-period panel data structure. The CA Gender Gap in column (1) is taken from the coefficient
Female in Table 3, column (3), OLS estimate and the Final Test Gender Gap in column (2) is taken from the coefficient
Female in Table B.1 in Appendix A, column (6), OLS estimate. The CA Gender Gap in columns (3) and (4) is taken
from the coefficient Female in Table 6, columns (1) and (2), respectively and the Final Test Gender Gap in columns
(3) and (4) is taken from the coefficient Female in Table B.2 in Appendix A, columns (1) and (2), respectively.
6.2.2 Heterogeneity analysis
Having estimated the gender gap in the main setting and checked the robustness of our results,
we now analyse the heterogeneous effects on the gender gap attributable to the different levels
of pressure experienced by students across the seven academic years when completing the CA
component and sitting the final test. In the main setting, we have studied the test pressure,
defined as the weight of a test in the overall course grade. In this heterogeneity analysis, we
analyse the second source of test pressure, that is, specific rules in the system of evaluation that
increases the students’ need to perform well. Recall that over the seven-year timespan the course
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coordinators introduced various changes to the evaluation system that determined the level of
pressure associated with the CA component and the final test. As explained in section 3.2, this
timespan can be divided into two intervals characterized by fairly homogenous test pressure:
the first, from 2009/10 to 2013/14, of high pressure, and the second, from 2013/14 to 2015/16,
of low pressure. This heterogeneity analysis allows us to test the hypothesis that as the test
pressure is increased, the wider the gender gap is in favour of male students.
For this purpose, we estimate Eq.(4) which contains two more variables than Eq.(3). We
introduce the dummy variable 1st Interval which takes a value of 1 for those years of higher test
pressure (first interval) and 0 for the years with lower test pressure (second interval). Moreover,
and more importantly, we introduce the interaction between this dummy variable and the student
gender variable: 1st Interval · Female. This interaction is our variable of interest, and shows
the additional gender gap that emerges in the years of higher test pressure. Table 8 reports the
estimates of the pooled OLS and RE with these two new variables. Since the time variable in
this data structure is the two periods (i.e., the CA and the final test), the two new variables
included in the specification are constant over the panel data. For this reason, the FE estimator
is not estimated since we would obtain the same results as those reported in column (3) in Table
6.
Table 8: Gender gap - Heterogenous Effects
Pooled OLS RE Pooled OLS RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.0650* 0.0650* 0.0650* 0.0650*
(0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350)
Final Test -0.0189 -0.0189 -0.0189 -0.0189
(0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377)
Female · Final Test -0.1337*** -0.1337*** -0.1337*** -0.1337***
(0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0374)
1st Interval 0.191*** 0.349***
(0.0227) (0.0273)
Female · 1st Interval -0.0633* -0.0633* -0.0633* -0.0633*
(0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0372)
N 7,444 7,444 7,444 7,444
Number of Ind. 3,722 3,722 3,722 3,722
Individual var. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No No No
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable measures the performance of students over the two periods: the CA grade in the first
and the final test grade in the second. The dependent variable is standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1
at each period and year level. The female dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the student is female and 0 otherwise.
The Final Test takes a value of 1 if the grade refers to the second period (final test grade) and 0 to the first period (CA
grade). The 1st Interval dummy variable takes a value of 1 if it refers to the first interval (high pressure) and 0 to the
second (low pressure). Standard errors, clustered at year-group level, are in parentheses and *** denotes significance
at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. Balanced sample.
Now, the interpretation of the dummy variable Female refers to the gender gap in the CA
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component during the second interval (low pressure). The interaction Female · Final Test is
interpreted as before, and is the difference in the gender gap associated with the CA component
and the final test. Female ·1st Interval is the difference in the gender gap between the first and
second intervals (for grades in general, both periods). The results in Table 8 show that in the
second low pressure interval, female students outperform male students on the CA component by
0.065 standard deviations, being statistically significant at the 10% level (Female coefficient).
The additional gender gap between the first period (CA) and the second period (final test),
Female ·Final Test, remains equal than before, -0.134 standard deviations, and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. However, male students outperform female students more in the
first interval than they do in the second by around 0.063 standard deviations, a result that is
statistically significant at the 10% level.
Interpreting the sign and magnitude of the dummy variable 1st Interval is not straightfor-
ward as it gives rise to collinearity with the year-group FE. This means that any interpretation
of this variable depends on the constant and the two year-group FE omitted. However, we are
interested in the additional gender gap that emerges in the high pressure interval, that is, the
interaction Female · 1st Interval, and not in the general differences between the two intervals.
In light of this, we estimate the same specification without the dummy variable 1st Interval to
check whether the coefficient of the interaction might present issues of collinearity. The results
in columns (3) and (4) are unchanged from those in columns (1) and (2), and the interaction
coefficient remains the same. This is because year-group FEs control perfectly for the differences
between the two intervals. As mentioned, we cannot measure the general effect of this pressure
heterogeneity, our interest lying solely in the interaction itself.
In order to understand the gender gap in each period and interval, the coefficients are
interpreted as follows. The gender gap in the CA component in the first interval is given by
Female + Female·1st Interval and the gender gap in the CA component in the second interval
is given by Female. Additionally, Female + Female·Final Test + Female·1st Interval shows
the gender gap in the final test in the first interval and Female + Female·Final Test the gender
gap in the final test in the second interval. Table 9 shows the computation of these four gender
gaps. In the CA component (low pressure), the gender gap is almost 0 in the first interval (high
pressure) and 0.065 standard deviations in favour of female students in the second interval (low
pressure). In the final test (high pressure), male students outperform female students in the
final test by around 0.132 standard deviations in the first interval (high pressure). However,
in the second interval (low pressure), the gender gap in favour of male students narrows to
0.069 standard deviations.20 Therefore, when we analyse for the two sources of test pressure,
we observe that as the test pressure increases, the gender gap grows in favour of male students.
However, as test pressure falls, the gender gap is mitigated, and is even reversed in favour of
female students. These important results can be easily interpreted in Figure 1.
20As a robustness exercise, we estimate the three augmented models using the pooled cross-sectional structure
for each grade and interval. OLS estimates in Table B.3 in Appendix A also show four similar gender gaps to
those shown in Table 9. In addition, Table B.4 shows the similarity between the estimates obtained using both
data structures.
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Table 9: Gender gap - 1st Interval and 2nd Interval
CA Grade (Low Pressure) Final Test Grade (High Pressure)
1st Int. (High) 2nd Int. (Low) 1st Int. (High) 2nd Int. (Low)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.0650* 0.0650* 0.0650* 0.0650*
Female · Final Test -0.1337*** -0.1337***
Female · 1st Interval -0.0633* -0.0633*
Gender Gap 0.0017 0.0650 -0.1320 -0.0687
Notes: Coefficients taken from Table 8 column (2). Gender Gap derived from own calculations with the estimated
coefficients.
Figure 1: Gender gap ordered from the lowest to the highest pressure scenario
Notes: The first level of pressure refers to CA-Final Test and the second one to first-second
interval. Therefore, Low-Low = CA - 2nd Interval, Low-High = CA - 1st Interval, High-Low
= Final Test - 2nd Interval, High-High = Final Test - 1st Interval. Coefficients obtained
from four different estimations. Positive gender gap is in favour of female students and
negative gender gap in favour of male students.
6.3 Potential mechanisms
The aim of this section is to analyse the possible mechanisms that might explain the gender
differences identified above in response to test pressure. First, we seek to disentangle the gender
gap and analyse whether female students choke under pressure or whether male students are
more highly motivated when placed under pressure. Second, we examine gender differences in
the way students answering multiple choice tests. More specifically, we seek to find differences
in item omission strategies in the final test.
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6.3.1 Disentangling the gender gap
Do female students choke under pressure and, as result, perform worse? Or, are male students
motivated by pressure and, so, perform better? Or, are these two mechanisms operating simulta-
neously? To address these questions, we estimate the two-period panel data separately for female
and male students. Thus, the dummy variable Female and the interaction Female ·Final Test
are not included in these specifications. The variable of interest as we seek to identify differences
across gender is the dummy variable Final Test and its significance, sign and magnitude. Table
10 reports the results for each gender using RE and FE.
Table 10: Gender differences between the CA and final test grades
RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Male Female Male
Final Test -0.1525*** -0.0189 -0.1525*** -0.0189
(0.0358) (0.0378) (0.0355) (0.0375)
N 3,604 3,840 3,604 3,840
Number of Ind. 1,802 1,920 1,802 1,920
Individual var. Yes Yes No No
Individual FE No No Yes Yes
Year-Group FE Yes Yes No No
Notes: The dependent variable measures performance (the CA grade in the first period; the final test grade in the
second period). The dependent variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at each period and
year level. The dummy variable Final Test takes a value of 1 in the second period (final test, i.e. high pressure) and
0 in the first period (CA, i.e. low pressure). Standard errors, clustered at year-group level, are in parentheses and
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. Individual variables: age, nationality,
university access grade, number of courses enrolled on in the first term, average grade obtained that first term, and
status as scholarship holder and repeat student.
The dummy variable Final Test identifies differences in performance between the CA and
the final test for female and male students, respectively. The RE and FE results are very
similar, and show that female students perform worse on the final test than on the CA com-
ponent, by around 0.15 standard deviations (statistically significant at the 1% level). However,
the performance of male students on the CA component and final test are largely the same,
their performance decreasing by around 0.02 standard deviations (which is not statistically sig-
nificant). On the one hand, these results indicate that female students tend to choke under
pressure, and that their performance suffers when they face a high pressure test environment.
On the other hand, male students appear not to be affected by higher test pressure and their
performance remains unchanged. To sum up, when the weight attached to a test in the overall
grade is high, female students may choke under pressure, while male students appear unaffected.
We repeat this exercise for the heterogeneity setting, that is, when the test pressure is
attributable to the rules of the evaluation system. We estimate the same specifications as in Table
11 but add the dummy variable 1st Interval. Now, we are interested in interpreting this variable:
that is, in identifying its significance, sign and magnitude. Since we have collinearity between
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the dummy variable 1st Interval and the year-group FE, we estimate the regressions without
the year-group FE to overcome this issue. Table 11 shows the results from these estimates
controlling with group variables and group FE.
Table 11: Gender differences between the CA and final test grades - heterogeneity analysis
RE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Male Female Male
Final Test -0.153*** -0.019 -0.153*** -0.019
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
1st Interval 0.056 0.164*** 0.039 0.116***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
N 3,604 3,840 3,604 3,840
Number of Ind. 1,802 1,920 1,802 1,920
Group FE No No Yes Yes
Group var. Yes Yes No No
Notes: The dependent variable measures performance (the CA grade in the first period; the final test grade in the
second period). The dependent variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at each period and year
level. The dummy variable Final Test takes a value of 1 in the second period (final test, i.e. high pressure) and 0 in the
first period (CA, i.e. low pressure). Standard errors, clustered at year-group level, are in parentheses and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. Individual variables: age, nationality, university access
grade, number of courses enrolled on in the first term, average grade obtained that first term, and status as scholarship
holder and repeat student. Group variables: morning/afternoon group, percentage of female students in the group,
gender of the teacher, average age of group, group’s average access grade, average number of courses enrolled on by
group and the average grade obtained in that term’s courses by group.
The Final Test coefficient is unchanged, and is not affected by either the new dummy
variable or the elimination of the year-group FE. Male students perform better (the result being
statistically significant at the 1% level) during the first interval of years (high pressure) than
they do during the second (low pressure). However, there is no statistically significant difference
between the two intervals for the female students. Despite some differences in the 1st Interval
coefficient depending on the way we control for peer-group effects, the sign and significance
remain the same. Therefore, behaviour under pressure across gender changes when the source
of test pressure changes. In this case, male students perform better under pressure, while the
performance of female students remains unaffected. Thus, the additional gender gap estimated
in section 6.2.2 is attributable to an improvement in the performance of male students. The
second source of test pressure (i.e. rules of evaluation) is sensitive to the definition of the rules
themselves, while the first source of test pressure (i.e. the weight of an exam) is more general
and applicable.
6.3.2 Omitted questions
Both the economic and educational literature have analysed student behaviour when taking
multiple choice tests and, more specifically, several studies have examined gender differences
when responding to this test format. The typical focus is on the number of test items omitted,
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it has been shown that the number of questions omitted is a good predictor of the student’s
grade. While this information is not available for the midterms, it is for the final test. This
being the case, we use the pooled cross-sectional data structure to analyse gender differences
in omitting final test items. Here, we should stress that the QR identifies the distribution of
the number of omitted items, and not the grade distribution. Table 12 and Figure 2 show
the relation between the number of omitted questions on the final test and the grade scored.
The table reports the average final test grade in each part of the omitted-question distribution
showing that as the number of omitted test item increases, the lower the final test grade. This
negative relation is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Scatter plot of final test grade and number of omitted questions on the final test
Note: The final test comprises 20 questions and the grade ranges from 0 to 10.
Table 12: Mean final test grade by quantiles of omitted-question distribution
All 0-10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-90% 90-100%
Mean Final Test Grade 4.99 6.15 5.94 5.26 4.67 4.15 3.50
N 3,579 363 591 899 840 567 319
Table 13 reports the results obtained for the augmented baseline model with year-group FE
using OLS and QR. Female students omit more questions than their male counterparts on the
final test by around 0.24 standard deviations, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The gender gap on the omitted-question distribution widens from the first decile to the median,
before narrowing in the 75th percentile and the last decile of the distribution. For this reason, we
focus our attention on the interaction Female ·1st Interval, i.e. the first four years of our study
which are characterized by a higher degree of test pressure due to the rules of the evaluation
system. The OLS estimate shows that female students omit more questions than their male
counterpart in this first interval, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. However,
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the gender gap is significant at the 10% level in the first decile and the 25th percentile, which
corresponds to that part of the distribution in which students omit fewer items. According to
Table 12, this part of the omitted-question distribution concentrates students with the highest
final test grades, i.e. the best students. This result implies that students with the highest grades
are impacted more strongly by the test pressure attributable to specific evaluation rules than
are students with lower grades. In other words, among the best students, females omit more
questions than males on the final test.
Table 13: Gender differences in the omission of questions on the final test
OLS Quantile Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τ = 0.10 τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 τ = 0.90
Female 0.237*** 0.203*** 0.225*** 0.285*** 0.225*** 0.169*
(0.050) (0.064) (0.054) (0.053) (0.064) (0.087)
1st Interval -0.092* -0.187 -0.134 0.074 -0.0282 -0.347
(0.052) (0.334) (0.222) (0.228) (0.285) (0.451)
Female ∗ 1st Interval 0.071 0.242* 0.196* 0.076 -0.019 0.024
(0.078) (0.124) (0.109) (0.092) (0.099) (0.125)
N 3,579 3,579 3,579 3,579 3,579 3,579
Notes: The dependent variable measures the number of omitted question on the final test. It is standardized with mean
0 and standard deviation 1 at year level. The female dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the student is female and
0 otherwise. Final Test takes a value of 1 if the grade refers to the second period (final test grade), and 0 to the first
period (CA grade). 1st Interval dummy variable takes a value of 1 if it refers to the first interval (high pressure), and
0 to the second interval (low pressure). Standard errors, clustered at year-group level, for the OLS and bootstrapped
standard errors with 1,000 replications for the QR, are in parentheses and *** denotes significance at the 1% level, **
the 5% level and * the 10% level. The sample includes 3,579 students as opposed to 3,722, as information was missing
for 143 students. Individual variables: age, nationality, university access grade, number of courses enrolled on in the
first term, average grade obtained that first term, and status as scholarship holder, repeat student and CA grade. All
the regressions include individual variables and year-group FE.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has analysed gender differences in academic performance in response to different
levels of test pressure, measured as the weight of a specific test in the overall course grade and
in relation to a number of rules in the system of evaluation that increase the importance of
a good performance. The specific design of the evaluation system of a course taught at the
University of Barcelona allows us to exploit a unique quasi-experimental set up. In this setting,
students first take midterm tests as part of the CA component (designated low pressure), and,
at the end of the term, they sit the final exam which includes a multiple choice test (designated
high pressure). Our primary goal has been to analyse the performance of those students who
complete both the CA component and the final exam and, in so doing, ensure that our results
are not biased by individuals who drop out of the course during the term or by those who opt
solely to sit the final exam. This focus allows us to construct a panel data structure. Our main
findings suggest that there are indeed gender differences in student responses to test pressure.
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In this balanced sample, male students are found to outperform female students under high
test pressure (by between 0.065 and 0.13 standard deviations). However, as the test pressure
decreases, the gender gap in favour of male students is narrowed until it is mitigated (0.002
standard deviations) and ultimately, in the lowest pressure scenario, reversed in favour of female
students (0.065 standard deviations). We analysed the possible presence of sample selection in
relation to completing the CA component and sitting the final exam. Our findings show that
female students are more likely than their male counterparts to complete the CA component,
while there are no gender differences with regards to sitting the final exam. Therefore, our
results hold true for the majority of students (balanced sample – 78%) and, when generalizing
the findings to all students, the Heckman technique reinforces these findings.
We have also examined the potential mechanisms that might account for these gender gaps
and find that they are likely to differ depending on the source of test pressure. When we analyse
the pressure attributable to the weight of the test, female students appear more likely to choke
under pressure, while male students maintain their level of performance. Thus, the gender
gap results from a fall in the performance of female students. However, our analysis of the
test pressure attributable to the rules of the evaluation system shows that male students are
more likely to excel while the performance of female students remains unchanged. Thus, in this
instance, the gender gap results from a hike in the performance of male students. Moreover,
there is suggestive evidence that the top female students omit more items than male students
on the final test as test pressure rises.
The findings reported herein concur with those studies that provide evidence of a gender gap
in academic performance attributable to pressure. Thus, we find studies in which male students
outperform female students when faced with high levels of pressure (Ors et al., 2013; Iriberri
and Rey-Biel, 2018; Jurajda and Münich, 2011; Pekkarinen, 2015), as well as reports that either
find no gender differences or evidence indicating that girls outperform boys when faced with low
levels of pressure (Ors et al., 2013; Jurajda and Münich, 2011). In contrast, but at the school
level, Azmat et al. (2016) find that girls outperform boys and that this gender gap narrows
as pressure increases. However, when these authors turn their attention to university entrance
exams – a very high stakes test – they find that the gender gap disappears. Yet, it should be
borne firmly in mind that these last findings are drawn in relation to very different types of
courses and exams, and that the age range of their sample is from 12 to 18. Evidence also
indicates that in situations of high pressure the gender gap is increasing over the students’ grade
distribution (Ors et al., 2013; Jurajda and Münich, 2011). For example, Jurajda and Münich
(2011) find significant gender differences in the 50th and 75th percentiles as do Ors et al. (2013)
in the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. Here, in high pressure scenarios, we have found
significant gender differences in the 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles. Finally, female students
appear to omit more test items than do male students in multiple choice tests (Pekkarinen, 2015;
Espinosa and Gardeazabal, 2010). Here, moreover, we find that the gender gap in relation to the
omission of test items increases in high pressure scenarios for the best students, while Iriberri
and Rey-Biel (2018) make the same finding but for all students.
This study makes various contributions to the literature. First, a unique quasi-experimental
set up is exploited to analyse gender differences in response to test pressure at university. Using
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novel real-world data, we provide evidence of how university students respond to test pressure
and we highlight differences across gender in a common situation in higher education. Second,
the only study we are aware of that defines pressure as the weight of a specific exam uses field
data at the school level. Moreover, we incorporate a new source of test pressure that depends
on the specific rules applied in the course’s evaluation system. As such, this study contributes
to a greater understanding of gender differences in academic performance at the university level.
Third, the setting offers the following strengths: (i) there is no gender bias in test correction
as this is performed by machine or computer, (ii) the exams compared are of the same type
(multiple choice) and, moreover, made up of similar questions with a similar level of difficulty,
and (iii) the main setting analyses the same students when they find themselves in different
scenarios of pressure. Fourth, the fact that students take multiple choice tests allows us to
examine how the gender gap in terms of item omission varies with test pressure. Fifth, our
results provide further evidence in the current debate about the adequacy of the multiple choice
format of testing.
This study provides additional evidence about gender differences in the taking of multiple
choice tests. We confirm that the strategies employed on such tests vary with gender and that
female students are more likely to omit test items. Some studies have shown that multiple choice
tests benefit certain subgroups, above all male students, and so call into question the suitability
of this type of exam (Riener and Wagner, 2017; Espinosa and Gardeazabal, 2010). Clearly,
education systems should be assessing student knowledge and abilities, and not student test-
taking strategies – differences in grades should be driven by differences in abilities (Riener and
Wagner, 2017). Yet, university groups are large and teachers have to mark many exam scripts
in a short period of time. Given these circumstances and the low level of resource provision for
teaching at university, it is far from easy to offer university teachers a feasible alternative to the
multiple choice test format.
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Figure A.1: Subgroups of students by system of evaluation on the Principles of Taxation course
(number and percentage)
Note: All percentage calculations made for the whole sample (i.e. 100%).
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for the CA and final test grades - balanced sample
CA grade Final Test
Male Female Statistic Male Female Statistic
1st Interval (N=1,449)
N 684 765
Percentage (%) 47.2 52.8
Hao : Pr(Mi) = 0.5 2.128**
Hbo : Pr(Mi) = Pr(Fi) 3.001***
Mean Test 5.34 5.44 -1.024 4.42 4.35 0.683
Median Test 5.44 5.5 0.201 4.38 4.38 0.0002
KS Test 0.051 0.023
10th percentile 2.82 3.04 1.88 1.88
25th percentile 4.18 4.44 3 3
50th percentile 5.44 5.5 4.38 4.38
75th percentile 6.63 6.71 5.75 5.63
90th percentile 7.58 7.63 7.13 6.88
2nd Interval (N=2,463)
N 1,337 1,126
Percentage (%) 54.3 45.7
Hao : Pr(Mi) = 0.5 -4.252***
Hbo : Pr(Mi) = Pr(Fi) -6.013***
Mean Test 4.74 5.13 -4.078*** 5.22 5.15 1.009
Median Test 4.88 5.44 15.907*** 5.25 5.13 1.788
KS Test 0.088*** 0.034
10th percentile 1.32 1.57 2.88 2.9
25th percentile 2.82 3.63 3.9 4
50th percentile 4.88 5.44 5.25 5.13
75th percentile 6.63 6.88 6.5 6.38
90th percentile 7.82 8 7.6 7.4
Notes: We define the first interval, 2009/10-2012/13, as being of high pressure and the second, 2013/14-2015/16, as
being of low pressure. In line with the definition of a balanced sample, students opting for CA and sitting the final
test are the same. Therefore, the number of males and females, their percentages and Tests a and b are the same for
CA and the final test. The null hypothesis for Test a (Hao ) is that the proportion of males (Mi) is equal to 50% and
for Test b (Hbo) that the proportion of males (Mi) and females (Fi) are equal, where i denotes the CA or final test
sample. Z-statistic for Test a and b. The null hypothesis for the Mean Test is equal mean grades across the gender
(unequal variances), t-statistic. The Median Test is a non-parametric 2-sample test in which the null hypothesis is
equal medians across gender, chi-squared test statistic with continuity correction. The KS Test is the Two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test in which the null hypothesis is equal grades distribution (CA or final test, respectively)
across gender, D-statistic. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level.
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The final grade of the CA is standardised with mean 0 and standard
deviation 1 at year level.
Final Test grade
The grade of the multiple choice part of the final exam, standardised
with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at year level.
Number of omitted questions
The number of omitted items on the multiple choice part of the final
exam (out of 20 questions), standardised with mean 0 and standard
deviation 1 at year level.
2. Individual characteristics
Age
The age variable is the difference between 1st September of the year in
which student is enrolled on Principles of Taxation and their date of
birth.
Nationality
Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if Spanish national and 0 if
other nationality.
University access grade
The grade ranges between 1 and 10. The grade comprises 60% from the
two years of high school grade (Bachillerato) and 40% from the university
entrance examination (Selectividad).
No of courses enrolled
The number of courses that the student enrolled on in the first term of
the academic year in question, Principles of Taxation included.
Average grade from the courses
Average grade of all the courses that the student enrolled the first term
of the academic year, Principles of Taxation included.
Repeat Student
Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the student has failed the
course in a previous year, 0 otherwise.
Scholarship
Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the student has been awarded
a scholarship that year, 0 otherwise.
3. Group characteristics
Morning group
Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the student is enrolled in a
morning group, 0 otherwise.
% of female classmates
Percentage of female students in that group (taking into account all the
students enrolled in the group).
Age
The average age of the whole group (taking into account all the students
enrolled in the group).
No of courses enrolled
The average number of courses that students in this group enrolled on
in the first term of the academic year in question, Principles of Taxation
included.
Average grade from the courses
The average grade of the group from all the courses that the students
enrolled on in the first term of the academic year in question, Principles
of Taxation included.
Female teacher
Variable which ranges from 0 to 1. This is the proportion of female
professors teaching that group, in ECTS terms.
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Figure A.2: Kernel density estimations for the whole timespan - balanced sample
(a) CA grade by gender. (b) Final Test by gender.
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Figure A.3: Kernel density estimations for the whole timespan - balanced sample
(a) CA grade by gender - 1st Interval. (b) CA grade by gender - 2nd Interval.
(c) Final Test by gender - 1st Interval. (d) Final Test by gender - 2nd Interval.
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B Additional Results
Table B.1: Gender gap in the first midterm (CA) and in the final test with the CA grade as an
explanatory variable - balanced sample
Panel A: 1st Midterm (CA) Panel B: Final Test Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ordinary Least Square
Female 0.056* 0.057** 0.054* -0.087*** -0.090*** -0.086***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Quantile Regressions
τ = 0.10 0.007 -0.009 -0.001 -0.014 -0.028 -0.029
(0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.056) (0.052) (0.057)
τ = 0.25 0.092* 0.085* 0.091* -0.032 -0.049 -0.0408
(0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.035) (0.039) (0.038)
τ = 0.50 0.080** 0.086** 0.063 -0.144*** -0.125*** -0.128***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.034) (0.038)
τ = 0.75 0.080** 0.087** 0.083** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.114***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
τ = 0.90 0.031 0.045 0.013 -0.160*** -0.175*** -0.156***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045)
N 3,542 3,542 3,542 3,722 3,722 3,722
Adj.R2OLS 0.227 0.231 0.248 0.320 0.323 0.336
Individual var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group var. Yes No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Group FE No Yes No No Yes No
Year-Group FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable measures the 1st midterm grade in columns (1) to (3) and the final test grade in columns
(4) to (6). Each dependent grade variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at year level. The
coefficients shown are the female dummy variable (1 if female student) for the OLS and QR. Standard errors, clustered
at year-group level, for the OLS and bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 replications for the QR. Standard errors
are in parentheses and *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. 190 observations
were discarded because the students had no university access grade (having accessed the degree via another path) or
no average grade for the first term (students who enroll but then fail to take any course). We do not dispose of the
grade for the first midterm in the 2009/10 academic year. Individual variables: age, nationality, university access grade,
number of courses enrolled on in the first term, average grade obtained that first term, and status as scholarship holder
and repeat student. Estimations in columns (4) to (6) include the CA grade (not standardised) as an explanatory
variable. Group variables: morning/afternoon group, percentage of female students in the group, gender of the teacher,
average age of group, group’s average access grade, average number of courses enrolled on by group and the average
grade obtained in that term’s courses by group.
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Table B.2: Gender Gap - Main Setting (CA dummy variable)




CA 0.0189 0.0189 0.0189
(0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0375)
Female · CA 0.1337*** 0.1337*** 0.1337***
(0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0372)
N 7,444 7,444 7,444
Number of Ind. 3,722 3,722 3,722
Individual var. Yes Yes No
Individual FE No No Yes
Period FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-Group FE Yes Yes No
Notes: The dependent variable measures student performance over the two periods: the CA grade in the first period
and the final test grade in the second. The dependent variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1
at each period and year level. The female dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the student is female and 0 otherwise.
The CA grade takes a value of 1 if it refers to the first period (CA grade) and 0 to the second period (final test grade).
Standard errors, clustered at year-group level are in parentheses and *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the
5% level and * the 10% level. Balanced sample.
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Table B.3: Gender gap in the CA and final test grades across intervals - balanced sample
CA Grade (low pressure) Final Test Grade (high pressure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Interval
Female -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.117** -0.115** -0.115**
(0.0227) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0418)
τ = 0.10 -0.0644 -0.0856 -0.0875 -0.0685 -0.0704 -0.0662
(0.0875) (0.0875) (0.0801) (0.0962) (0.0947) (0.0987)
τ = 0.25 0.0131 -0.0119 -0.00369 -0.108* -0.109 -0.138**
(0.0572) (0.0586) (0.0593) (0.0610) (0.0664) (0.0664)
τ = 0.50 0.00547 -0.0131 -0.0113 -0.172*** -0.141** -0.142**
(0.0534) (0.0516) (0.0505) (0.0592) (0.0585) (0.0623)
τ = 0.75 0.00287 0.0104 0.0201 -0.0853 -0.0737 -0.0779
(0.0504) (0.0517) (0.0534) (0.0699) (0.0676) (0.0702)
τ = 0.90 -0.0421 -0.0186 -0.0201 -0.204*** -0.172** -0.186**
(0.0608) (0.0623) (0.0645) (0.0716) (0.0687) (0.0740)
N 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305
Adj.R2OLS 0.400 0.406 .412 0.372 0.372 0.382
2nd Interval
Female 0.0615 0.0640 0.0583 -0.0644* -0.0695** -0.0653*
(0.0407) (0.0409) (0.0416) (0.0320) (0.0323) (0.0323)
τ = 0.10 0.0460 0.0102 0.0524 -0.00434 -0.0430 -0.0422
(0.0565) (0.0505) (0.0575) (0.0681) (0.0689) (0.0708)
τ = 0.25 0.0850* 0.0846* 0.104** -0.00245 -0.00759 0.0120
(0.0502) (0.0509) (0.0511) (0.0459) (0.0486) (0.0488)
τ = 0.50 0.0973** 0.108** 0.0791 -0.112** -0.0878* -0.108**
(0.0478) (0.0452) (0.0493) (0.0476) (0.0462) (0.0498)
τ = 0.75 0.0560 0.0667 0.0390 -0.0908* -0.134*** -0.137***
(0.0447) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0523) (0.0485) (0.0515)
τ = 0.90 -0.00717 -0.00876 -0.0362 -0.132*** -0.151*** -0.124**
(0.0467) (0.0469) (0.0505) (0.0499) (0.0504) (0.0539)
N 2,417 2,417 2,417 2,417 2,417 2,417
Adj.R2OLS 0.299 0.301 0.308 0.302 0.304 0.315
Individual var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group var. Yes No No Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Group FE No Yes No No Yes No
Year-Group FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable measures the CA grade in columns (1) to (3) and the final test grade in columns (4) to
(6). Each dependent grade variable is standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at year level. The coefficients
shown are the female dummy variable (1 if female student) for the OLS and QR. Standard errors, clustered at year-
group level, for the OLS and bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 replications for the QR. Standard errors are in
parentheses and *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** the 5% level and * the 10% level. Individual variables: age,
nationality, university access grade, number of courses enrolled on in the first term, average grade obtained that first
term, and status as scholarship holder and repeat student. Estimations in columns (4) to (6) include the CA grade (not
standardised) as an explanatory variable. Group variables: morning/afternoon group, percentage of female students in
the group, gender of the teacher, average age of group, group’s average access grade, average number of courses enrolled
on by group and the average grade obtained in that term’s courses by group.
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Table B.4: Gender gap - Main setting and heterogeneity analysis
CA Grade (low pressure) Final Test Grade (high pressure)
1st Int. 2nd Int. 1st Int. 2nd Int.
(high) (low) (high) (low)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gender Gap (Pooled cross-section) -0.0113 0.0583 -0.115 -0.0653
Gender Gap (Two-period panel data) 0.0017 0.0650 -0.1320 -0.0687
Notes: Coefficients from the pooled cross-section taken from Table B.3, column (3) and (6), OLS estimates. Coefficients
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